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Questionnaire ‘Retroactivity and Tax Legislation’, EATLP 2010 
 
Denmark 
 
Professor Aage Michelsen, Aarhus Business School, University of Aarhus 
Associate Professor Jacob Graff Nielsen, Faculty of Law, University of 
Copenhagen1 
 
Please return your report, before September 15, 2009  
 
General preliminary remarks  
There are different concepts with various meanings when dealing with the 
phenomenon of retroactivity in legislation. Not only are various concepts used for 
‘retroactivity’ (e.g., retroactivity, retrospectivity, formal retroactivity, material 
retroactivity, and true retroactivity) but the same concept is often used with different 
meanings (viz., the concepts of retroactivity and retrospectivity2).  
In this questionnaire, the term ‘retroactivity’ means that the effective entrance date of 
(one of more provisions of) a statute is set at a date prior to the moment on which the 
statute enters into force (in Dutch fiscal literature, this is called ‘formal retroactivity’), 
i.e. (one of more provisions of) the statute covers the period before the date of entry 
into force. For example, a statute enters into force on February 1, 2010, and stipulates 
that a certain tax exemption is repealed as from January 1, 2009. 
The term ‘retrospectivity’ means that the statute has ‘immediate effect’ (i.e., the 
effective entrance date of a statute is the same date as the date on which the statute 
enters into force) without grandfathering, as a result of which the statute alters or 
affects the results of a past event for the future (in Dutch fiscal literature, this is called 
‘material retroactivity’). For example, a statute enters into force on January 1, 2010, 
and stipulates that a certain tax exemption is repealed as from that date without 
grandfathering accrued but unrealised gains, as a result of which gains that accrued 
prior to January 1, 2010 are not tax exempt although they accrued in a period when 
the exemption applied. 
Furthermore, if in this questionnaire a reference is made to the introduction of a tax 
statute, this includes the change (amendment) of an existing tax statute, for there is no 
conceptual difference between the two. After all, a change in an existing statute is 
realized by means of the introduction of a statute that provides for the change. 
 
A.  On terminology 
 
(1) In Dutch legal discourse, a distinction is usually made between formal 
retroactivity (here: retroactivity) and material retroactivity (here: 
retrospectivity). 
a. Does legal discourse in your country usually employ concepts like 
‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’? 
 
Danish legal theory employs the concept of retroactivity whereas the concept of 
retrospectivity is not acknowledged as separate legal concept. However, it seems that 
                                                 
1 Jacob Graff Nielsen is a member of Center for Legal Studies in Welfare and EU Marketintegration, 
cf. http://jura.ku.dk/welma/english/.  
2 See, e.g., the editors of British Tax Review, Retroactive or retrospective? A note on terminology, 
British Tax Review 2006, pp. 15-18. 
the concept of retrospectivity more or less corresponds to the concept of un-actual 
retroactivity in Danish law theory.3 We shall elaborate further on this concept below. 
 
It is important to accentuate that retroactive legislation is not prohibited pursuant to 
the Danish Constitution. At the same time it must be noted, that it is a fundamental 
legislative principle in Danish law that a statute that toughens the legal status is only 
given retroactive effect if this is found to be absolutely necessary. The assessment of 
necessity is based on the legislative reasons for and proportionality of the 
retroactivity. In effect, it often comes down to a political assessment if retroactive 
legislation is deemed necessary. Retroactive tax law statutes occur relatively often in 
Denmark.  
 
The legal concept of retroactivity4 corresponds to the Dutch concept as explained 
above: The effective entrance date of one or more provisions of a statute precedes the 
date on which the statute enters into force. This definition is developed further in 
Danish law theory by distinguishing between material and formal retroactivity. 
Material retroactivity concerns a situation where (provisions of) a statute has legal 
effect on dispositions or facts that have taken place before the statute enters into force 
by promulgation. Whereas Dutch discourse makes us of the terminology of formal 
retroactivity in this case, the corresponding Danish concept is materiel retroactivity. 
In Danish legal theory formal retroactivity occurs when (tax) authorities apply 
(provisions of) a statute before the statute enters into force. 
 
Consequently, the terminology of Dutch and Danish legal theory differs on use of the 
terms; material and formal retroactivity. 
 
Recently, several cases of formal retroactivity in connection with tax legislation have 
caused political debate in the Danish Parliament. For instance, the Government raised 
the age limit for last date of payment of capital pensions in connection with the recent 
Danish tax reform.5 Before the statute had been put into effect the Minister of 
Taxation contacted the pension institutes and requested that the institutes administered 
the new statute by withholding payments of capital pensions regardless of the original 
age limit until the new bill was passed. The request thus included capital pensions that 
exceeded the original age limit for payment of capital pensions in the period from the 
introduction of the bill to the date on which the statute was put into force. This 
procedure was criticised by political parties that are not members of the Government 
and the Tax Minister later recalled the request to the pension institutes. The statute 
includes some quite unusual provisions on the effect of the statute to remedy the 
effect of this very special procedure that can be considered as a sort of formal 
retroactivity. 
 
                                                 
3 In Danish: Uægte tilbagevirkende kraft. It is difficult to translate the concept to English. The phrase 
un-actual is chosen to indicate that this type of retroactivity is in effect not considered retroactive in 
Danish legal theory. The concept of un-actual retroactivity does not correspond to the concept of de 
facto retroactivity as mentioned below in question A, (2), b. 
4 In Danish: Tilbagevirkende kraft. 
5 Spring Tax Reform 2.0 (Forårspakken 2.0), Bill 200, 2008-2009 passed as statute 412 on May 29, 
2009. The relevant provisions concerning the age limit of payment of capital pension has effect for 
capital pensions that has not been taxed at the date on which the statute was put into force (May 31, 
2009). 
In Danish law theory it is debated whether it is correct to use the term that a statute 
“enters into force” retroactively or the term that a statute “has retroactive effect”.6 
However, this debate is primarily academically and it is generally accepted that both 
terms cover the same situation. 
 
Furthermore, Danish law theory distinguishes between actual and un-actual 
retroactivity. Whereas actual retroactivity covers the concept of (material) 
retroactivity as mentioned above, un-actual retroactivity more or less corresponds to 
the Dutch concept of retrospectivity or material retroactivity.  In Danish law theory, 
un-actual retroactive legislation refers to the situation where an amendment to a 
statute or a law reform has effect on past events for the future.    
  
b. Is a clear distinction usually made between ‘retroactivity’ and 
‘retrospectivity’? 
 
The distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity is not relevant in Danish law 
theory, but the Danish concepts of actual and un-actual retroactivity resemble the 
distinction to a great extent. The considerations against actual retroactive legislation 
are also relevant in case of un-actual retroactivity, but this type of retroactivity is in 
fact not considered retroactive as defined in this questionnaire.  
 
Recently, a case of un-actual retroactivity has caused debate in the Danish media.7 In 
February 2009 a bill concerning the taxation of stock gains obtained via foreign and 
non-EU investment institutes was passed.8 The effect of this amendment was that 
taxation of gains or losses via foreign and non-EU investment institutes changed from 
realization taxation to yearly taxation of unrealized gains or losses. The relevant 
provision had effect from the income year of 2009 while the statute as such came into 
force on February 13, 2009. This was, of course, actual and material retroactivity. 
However, the consequence of the change from realization taxation to yearly taxation 
of unrealized gains or losses from 2009 is that losses accrued before 2009 are not 
taken into consideration. This effect is only relevant for investments via a company in 
foreign non-EU investment institutes. The second aspect of retroactivity of this statute 
can be compared with the concept of retrospectivity which is called un-actual 
retroactivity in Danish legal theory.  
  
(2) It appears to be the case that, although the above-mentioned distinction 
between the two kinds of retroactivity (i.e., retroactive effect and 
retrospective effect) is recognised in most countries, there are some additional 
varieties. A first conceptual variation concerns the situation that, during a 
fiscal year, the income tax rules are changed as from the beginning of the 
fiscal year. For example, an income tax statute enters into force on July 1, 
2009, and stipulates that a certain tax exemption is repealed as from January 
1, 2009. In the Netherlands this would be regarded as retroactive. It appears 
that in some other countries it would not be regarded as (actual) retroactive, 
because – it is argued – the income tax obligation only arises at the end of the 
                                                 
6 It is difficult to translate the nuance difference between the Danish terms; enter into force (træde i 
kraft) and have effect (have virkning). Cf. Peter Germer, Statsforfatningsret I, Copenhagen, 2007, p. 
143.  
7 Cf. Morgenavisen Jyllands Posten, Erhvervsweekend, Saturday, 20th of June, 2009, p. 1 and p. 5. 
8 Bill 23, 2008-2009, passed as Statute 98 on February 2, 2009. 
year. In these countries, a conceptual distinction is made between a statute 
that applies to a previous year (actual retroactivity) and a statute that applies 
as from the beginning of the current year (de facto retroactivity).9 
a. Does legal discourse in your country usually employ this conceptual 
distinction? 
 
In Danish legal discourse, the above mentioned distinction between actual 
retroactivity and de facto retroactivity is not relevant. If a tax statute in Denmark 
enters into force on July 1, 2009, with effect from January 1, 2009, this is simply 
considered material retroactivity. 
 
b. If in your country the conceptual distinction is employed, please 
discuss, when answering the questions of section B, C, and D and 
question 20 of section F, whether this distinction is materially 
significant, e.g., whether different standards apply. 
(3) A second conceptual variation concerns the so-called interpretative statutes,10 
which are statutes that stipulate the interpretation of another statute and are 
often applicable as from the effective entrance date of that other statute. The 
Dutch legal system does not explicitly have the phenomenon of 
‘interpretative statute’. If the Dutch legislator introduces a statute with 
retroactive effect and explains that the statute provides an interpretation (i.e., 
only clarifies the meaning) of another statute, this statute is considered 
‘retroactive’ in Dutch legal discourse.11 It appears however that in some 
countries such a statute would not be called ‘retroactive’ and/or that in some 
countries even in the Constitution or the General Tax Act, it is explicitly 
provided that interpretative statutes apply as from the effective entrance date 
of that the statute to which the interpretation applies. 
a. Does the legal system of your country explicitly have the phenomenon 
of ‘interpretative statute’? 
 
Danish legal discourse fully resembles Dutch legal discourse in this respect. The 
concept of interpretive statute is not acknowledged in Danish law theory al though 
statutes that amend and thereby in effect interpret another retroactive statute are not 
uncommon. The interpretation of statutes does not always require an amendment by a 
new statute in Denmark and tax law statutes are to a high degree interpreted by the 
Courts or even by rulings from administrative tax authorities. As the Danish 
interpretational tradition is relatively pragmatic vagueness and ambiguity can be 
solved by practice. The Danish Tax Administration (SKAT) issues a large number of 
administrative notices12 of an interpretational nature. 
 
If retroactive tax law statutes are amended by another statute with effect from the 
effective entrance date of the original statute, the latest statute is considered 
                                                 
9 Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003, pp. 79-80. 
10 Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003, p. 76, 
mentions lois interprétatives (France), declatory legislation (United Kingdom) and legge di 
interpretazione autentica (Italy). 
11 Notwithstanding, when judging (e.g., by parliament or by the courts) whether the (proposed) 
retroactive effect is justified, it could be taken into account that the statute ‘only’ provides a 
clarification. 
12. In Danish these administrative notices are called: Styresignaler og meddelelser. These notices are 
published on SKAT’s homepage: www.skat.dk. 
retroactive in a material respect. The necessity of applying retroactive effect to the 
amendment is considered separately, but in many cases the same criteria that gave 
reason to the retroactivity of the first statute, are also relevant for the (interpretational) 
amendment. 
 
A specific principle of authentic interpretation has been acknowledged in earlier 
Danish legal theory.13 Authentic interpretation meant that a new statute could ascribe 
retroactivity to itself by containing information about the interpretation of a previous 
statute. According to authentic interpretation, retroactivity was not relevant if the 
meaning of a previous statute could be clarified by common interpretation principles. 
It is now assumed in current legal discourse that authentic interpretation of a 
retroactive nature requires the same assessment of necessity as retroactive legislation. 
  
b. If so: 
i. does the retroactive effect of such a statute has a legal basis in 
the Constitution or the General Tax Act? 
 
Not relevant in Danish law discourse, cf. above. Retroactivity is not prohibited 
pursuant to the Danish Constitution. 
 
ii. is there a special term for this kind of ‘retroactivity’? 
No, cf. above. 
iii. what standards are used to determine that the ‘interpretative 
statute’ is actually ‘interpretative’? Is it regarded as a problem 
that possibly the statute confirms the view of the tax 
authorities, while (some) tax payers have a 
defensible/justifiable different interpretative view? 
 
As mentioned above interpretational problems in connection with tax law statutes are 
either solved by passing amendments, by Court rulings or by changing administrative 
practice or issuing administrative notices. The distinction between interpretive statutes 
and other statutes (actual amendments) is not relevant in Danish law theory. From a 
Danish perspective it seems quite difficult if not impossible to make such a 
distinction. 
 
However, interpretational clarification of a retroactive statute with a date of effect that 
corresponds to the retroactive effect of the original statute can only be accomplished 
by a new retroactive statute.  
 
iv. when answering the questions of sections B, C, and D and 
question 22 of section F, please discuss whether different 
standards are used for examining retroactivity of interpretative 
statutes (in comparison with the normal standards used to 
examine retroactivity). 
 
(4) A third conceptual variation concerns the so-called validation statutes. A 
judicial decision may deviate from the legal practice (shared view by tax 
                                                 
13 Cf. Poul Andersen: Forvaltningsret, 5. ed., 1965, p. 28 and Peter Germer: Statsforfatningsret, 4. ed., 
2007, p. 147-48. 
payers and tax authorities) or the view of the tax authorities. It happens that 
the legislator then introduces a statute with retroactive effect to ‘validate’ the 
legal practice or the view of the tax authorities. Although it sometimes 
happens that the Dutch tax legislator introduces a statute with retroactive 
effect to ‘overrule’ a judicial decision, the phenomenon ‘validation statute’ is 
not recognised as such. 
a. Does your legal system recognise the phenomenon of ‘validation 
statute’ as such? 
 
It is essential to accentuate that general retroactive changes of administrative tax law 
practice in a way that is unfavourable to tax payers is not allowed in Denmark. This 
was established by the Danish Supreme Court in 198414 and has been confirmed in 
subsequent court rulings, cf. TfS 1984, 138 Ø, TfS 1986, 615 H. 
 
The concept of validation statutes is not acknowledged in Danish legal discourse. 
Retroactive changes to practice by a validation statute would be considered a 
worrying approach in Danish law, but the Danish Constitution does not prohibit that 
the legislator changes practice retroactively. As a consequence, the problem is of a 
politico-legal character. If the legislator should choose to abandon a favourable 
practice which has been developed by the courts of law with retroactive effect, this 
approach could be contrary to the provision on resumption in the Tax Administration 
Act sec. 25 (1) (7). 
 
The usual solution by the legislator in Denmark is to grant retroactivity to a statute 
with effect from the date on which the bill is introduced to the Danish Parliament. 
Even if the favourable practice is found to be unacceptable, a so called validating 
statute would normally not be granted retroactive effect further back.  
   
b. If so:  
i. what standards are used to determine that the ‘validation 
statute’ really validates legal practice (and not only the 
unilateral view of the tax authorities)? 
 
This question is not relevant to Danish law. 
 
ii. what is the difference between a ‘validation statute’ and an 
‘interpretative statute’ (if, in your country, this phenomenon is 
also separately recognised)? 
 
No distinction between validation statutes and interpretative statutes is found in 
Danish discourse. 
 
iii. when answering the questions of section B, C, and D and 
question 22 of section F, please discuss whether different 
standards are used for examining/assessing? retroactivity of 
validation statutes (in comparison with the normal standards 
used to judge retroactivity). 
                                                 
14 Cf. UfR 1983.8 H and Aage Michelsen, Steen Askholt, Jane Bolander og John Engsig: Lærebog om 
indkomstskat, 13. ed., 2009, p. 119. 
(5) In the Dutch legal system, the date of the entry into force of a statute should 
be on or after the date of publication of the statute in the Government Gazette. 
A conceptual distinction is made between the date of entry into force of a 
statute and the effective date of a statute. If retroactive effect is granted to a 
statute by the legislator, the date of entry into force still is a future date, but 
the statute’s effective entrance date is a date in the past. This explains why, at 
least in Dutch legal discourse, the relevant moment to compare with in order 
to determine whether a statute has retroactive effect, is the date of the entry 
into force of the statute. 
a. Does legal discourse in your country also employ a difference between 
the date of entry into force of a statute and the effective date of a 
statute? And is the ‘comparison moment’ also the moment of entry into 
force, or is it the moment of the publication in the government’s 
official journal? 
 
Pursuant to sec. 22 of the Danish Constitution all statues have to be promulgated to be 
valid and the procedure of promulgation is regulated in the Danish Law Gazette Act.15  
Section 3 of the Danish Law Gazette Act stipulates that statutes come into force at the 
beginning of the twenty-four hour period ensuing the twenty-four hour period in 
which the statute is published in the Gazette. For instance, if a statute is published in 
the Gazette on October 1, 2009, the statute comes into effect the exact moment the 
clock passes midnight between October 1 and October 2, 2009. It is, of course, 
possible for the Parliament to introduce another date and time of effect for a statute 
including a date and time that is retroactive, but this has to be expressly stipulated in 
the statute. 
 
It is considered a basic interpretation principle that statutes – as a rule – only have 
effect on future events and dispositions. As a consequence, it has to be obvious in the 
provisions concerning the effect of the statute that retroactivity is intended.16  A 
disputed example of this interpretation principle contra retroactivity concerns change 
of provisions in connection with resumption of tax assessment. 
 
UfR 1999.1480 H: This Supreme Court ruling concerns an amendment to the 
former Tax Administration Act sec. 35. Pursuant to the original phrasing of 
sec. 35, the Tax Administration could reassume the tax assessment no later 
than three years after the expiration of the relevant assessment year. This 
resumption provision was amended by a statute which came into effect on 
January 1, 1996. According to the new phrasing of sec. 35, the Tax 
Administration could reassume tax assessment no later than May 1, the fourth 
year after the expiration of year which the tax assessment concerned. On April 
1, 1996, the Tax Administration gave notice of a resumption of a tax 
assessment concerning the income year of 1992. This was only possible 
according to the new phrasing of the Tax Administration Act sec. 35 which 
came into effect on January 1, 1996. A majority of the Supreme Court judges 
(3-2) came to the conclusion that the retroactive effect of the amendment was 
sufficiently indicated in legislative material.17    
                                                 
15 Cf. Consolidated act on Law Gazette no. 608 issued on June 24, 2008 (in Danish: Lovtidendeloven).   
16 Cf. UfR 1996.68 H (insufficient indication of retroactivity), UfR 1996.1474 Ø (insufficient 
indication of retroactivity), UfR 1999.1480 H (sufficient indication of retroactivity). 
17 This ruling is critizised by Peter Germer in Statsforfatningsret, 4. ed., 2007, p. 149. 
 
As in Dutch law discourse, the relevant moment of comparison when establishing if a 
statute is retroactive, is the time of promulgation or publication of the relevant 
statute.18   
 
(6) Although, in Dutch legal discourse, material retroactivity (‘retrospectivity’) is 
distinguished from formal retroactivity, there is not one definition of material 
retroactivity that is generally accepted and used. Furthermore, it is not clear 
which situation is one of ‘material retroactivity’. The above-mentioned 
example of a statute that enters into force on January 1, 2010, and that 
stipulates that a certain tax exemption is repealed as from that date without 
grandfathering accrued but unrealised gains, would certainly be regarded as 
an example of ‘material retroactivity’. However, if a statute that enters into 
force and that stipulates that interest on a certain type of loan is not tax-
deductible anymore without grandfathering existing loans, many but not all 
authors in literature would call that ‘material retroactive’. 
a. How is the concept of retrospectivity defined in your country? 
 
As mentioned above, retrospectivity as a concept does not exist in Danish legal 
discourse. However, the Danish terminology of un-actual retroactivity seems to cover 
the same situation as the Dutch concept of material retroactivity or retrospectivity. To 
clarify this further, that Danish terminology operates with three different situations: 
− Facta praeterita: Legislation with effect on past events and/or transactions 
and described as material and actual retroactive. 
− Facta futura: Legislation with effect on future events and/or dispositions. 
This sort of legislations is not considered retroactive in any way.  
− Facta pendentia: Legislation with effect on continuous events and/or 
transactions. This sort of legislation covers events that occur partly before 
and partly after the point of time when the relevant statute comes into 
effect  
It is disputed in Danish discourse, if the last-mentioned sort of legislation can be 
considered retroactive at all and the literature concerning un-actual retroactivity is not 
extensive. Generally, it is concluded that un-actual retroactive legislation involves 
some of the same challenges for due process protection as (actual) material 
retroactivity. In connection with tax law statutes it can be considered customary to 
introduce transitional rules that take into consideration continuous events. If, for 
instance, an asset that was exempt from taxation before the introduction of a new 
statute, is covered by capital gains taxation with effect from January 1, 2009, asset 
value added before the date of effect will normally be exempt from taxation. In this 
way, un-actual retroactivity is generally avoided. 
 
As actual material retroactivity is allowed by the Danish Constitution, un-actual 
retroactivity can also occur. Generally, un-actual retroactive tax law statutes require 
the same assessment of necessity as actual material retroactivity.  
  
b. Please provide some examples of situations that would be regarded as 
retrospective and – if possible – some examples of situations that 
would not be regarded as retrospective. 
                                                 
18 Cf. Peter Germer: Statsforfatningsret, 4. ed., 2007, p. 148. 
 
Un-actual retroactivity is exemplified above as a part of the answer on question A, 
(1), b, and A, (6), a. We refer to these examples. 
  
(7) With respect to the impact of a statute having ‘immediate effect’, a distinction 
is usually made between substantive statutes and procedural statutes. A 
substantive statute with immediate effect applies to taxable events occurring 
after the date on which the statute enters into force, while a procedural statute 
immediate effect is directly applicable on pending proceedings (so also to 
proceedings regarding taxable events that occurred prior to the date on which 
the statute enters into force).19  
a. Is this distinction (with respect to the impact of a statute having 
immediate effect) between substantive statutes and procedural statutes 
also made in your country?  
 
A distinction between substantive and procedural statutes is not part of Danish 
discourse on retroactivity. However, a case law study indicates that a distinction 
between procedural retroactivity and substantive statutes can be registered. The case 
(UfR 1999.1480 H) mentioned in section A, (5), a, can be considered an example of a 
procedural statute with immediate effect. The change of the former Tax 
Administration Act was disadvantageous to the tax payer as the amendment allowed 
resumption of a tax assessment that was not possible pursuant to the former phrasing 
of the provision in mention. None the less, the Danish Supreme Court allowed the 
procedural retroactivity as it was found to be the intention of the legislator. The 
implications of this ruling are disputed. 
 
The Danish High Court came to another conclusion in a case concerning procedural 
rules on debt collection cf. UfR 1998.1086 Ø. The case concerned a demand for 
payment that was made before a statute came into effect that changed the 
requirements for this type of demands. The Danish High Court found that it was 
unsubstantiated to assume that the demand for payment made before the date of effect 
of the amendment should meet the requirements of the new statute to form basis of an 
ensuing execution. Though this case does not relate to tax procedure it might indicate 
that the Danish interpretational principle contra retroactivity also applies in cases 
concerning procedural retroactivity. 
 
However, this point of view is contradicted by the Danish Supreme Court in a later 
case cf. UfR 2000.1682 H. In this case the Supreme Court concluded that if a statute 
implementing changes of criminal procedure does not contain transitional provisions 
the statute in mention applies to ongoing criminal cases. It would appear that this case 
contradicts the High Court ruling referred in UfR 1998.1086 Ø, but it is assumed that 
it is not possible to generalize from these two cases.20 
 
These cases indicate that Danish law theory and case law are not consistent as regards 
procedural retroactivity.   
                                                 
19 E.g., ECJ C-61/98 (De Haan), pt. 13: “It should be noted in this connection that, according to settled 
case-law, procedural rules are generally held to apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they 
enter into force, whereas substantive rules are usually interpreted as not applying to situations existing 
before their entry into force.” 
20 Cf Peter Germer: Statsforfatningsret, 4. ed., 2007, p. 147.  
   
b. If so, what kind of tax rules are considered procedural rules (e.g., also 
rules regarding evidence and the burden of proof)? 
 
As mentioned, the distinction between substantive and procedural statutes in Denmark 
is far from consistent and of dubious value in connection with retroactivity. The 
Danish understanding of procedural rules include all provisions concerning 
administrative tax complaints, tax assessment procedure, time limits for filing 
complaints and resumption, rules regarding evidence and burden of proof etc.    
 
 
NB  
(i)If relevant, please state two differences in the use of the concepts in fiscal 
literature, case law, and parliamentary history; 
(ii) If in your country the meaning of or the application of concepts differs depending 
on the nature of the tax concerned (e.g., (corporate) income tax, VAT, withholding 
tax, etc), please discuss. 
 
B.  Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity 
 
(8) In some countries, the Constitution imposes limitations to retroactivity of tax 
statutes. There seem to be three variants: (i) the limitations are derived from a 
general principle (e.g., the principle of legal certainty, the principle of 
legitimate expectations, the principle of equality, the principle of the rule of 
law, and the ability to pay principle) that is laid down in the Constitution, (ii) 
the limitations are explicitly laid down in a general21 provision, (iii) the 
limitations are explicitly laid down in a provision that specifically regards 
taxation. 
a. Does your Constitution include a provision that imposes limitations to 
retroactivity of tax statutes? If so, what variant(s)? 
 
As mentioned above in section A, (1), a, the Danish Constitution does not impose 
limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes. The interpretation principle contra 
retroactivity implies the existence of a requirement for explicit consent from the 
legislator to retroactive statutes. This principle could be considered constitutional, but 
is has not been acknowledged as such in Danish legal discourse.  
 
The fundamental reservations concerning retroactivity in Danish legal theory that is 
the reason for the assessment of necessity and the interpretation principle contra 
retroactivity are undoubtedly based on the above mentioned principles including the 
principle of legal certainty, the principle of legitimate expectations, the principle of 
equality and the principle of the rule of law. The nature of these principles is probably 
considered to be primarily politico-legal rather than constitutional when it comes to 
retroacticity. 
 
(9) The Dutch State Secretary of Finance has published (and discussed with 
Parliament) a memorandum that incorporates the main lines of his ‘transition 
policy’ with respect to the introduction of tax statutes. The memorandum is 
                                                 
21 Not only regarding tax statutes. 
not legally binding, but it has some influence in the parliamentary debate, for 
example, in the event that a bill includes retroactive effect. 
a. Does the government of your country have a transition policy in 
general and/or in the field of tax statutes, and if so has the policy been 
published?  
 
The Danish Ministry of Justice has issued Guidance on Legislation Quality22 that 
contains a brief account of retroactive legislation.23 Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Justice has issued a circular concerning provision on effect and promulgation.24 None 
of these two publications contain provisions on transition policy. The Danish Ministry 
of Taxation has no guidelines or official policy about transition provisions that are 
available to the public. 
 
However, it is evident that the Ministry of Taxation puts a lot of effort in drawing up 
transitional provisions in tax law statutes. As a rule, extra attention is devoted to 
transitional provisions in connection with preparatory work on retroactive tax law 
statutes.  
 
b. If so, in what form has this been done, e.g., in a kind of memorandum 
or an Act? To what extent is this policy legally binding, e.g., has it 
only influence in the parliamentary debate or do also judges take the 
policy into account if they test transition law for compatibility? 
 
As no official guidelines or policy on transition exist, this question is to a less degree 
relevant to Denmark.  
 
The responsibility regarding transitional provisions is primarily handled by the 
Ministry of Taxation with assistance from the Ministry of Justice. Due to considerable 
attention to transition in connection with tax law statutes, the Danish Parliament often 
includes transition and retroactivity in debates as part of the parliamentary readings. 
Furthermore, the Committee of Fiscal Affairs often includes an assessment on the 
date of effect and transitional provisions concerning tax statutes. 
 
In 2006 the Danish Law Gazette Act was amended and according to the legislative 
history behind the amendment it is common legislative practice for statutes to include 
provisions on the statutes date of effect and transitional matters. It was also concluded 
in the preparatory materieal behind the amendment, that statutes often deviate from 
the date of effect according to the Danish Law Gazette Act sec. 3. 
   
c. If a transition policy in the field of tax statutes has been published, 
what are the policy guidelines with respect to (i) granting retroactive 
effect to statutes and (ii) grandfathering?  
 
The considerations concerning retroactivity including the assessment of necessity and 
the criteria that forms the basis of this assessment are mentioned above in section A, 
(1), a. No detailed transition policy or guidelines exist. 
 
                                                 
22 The guidance from June 2005 is avaliable at the Ministry of Justice’s homepage: www.jm.dk.  
23 Cf. The Ministry of Justice’s Guidance on Legislation Quality section 4.3.3. 
24 Circular no. 4, January 10, 1966. 
d. Is there also a policy with respect to granting retroactive effect to tax 
statutes that are favourable to tax payers? 
 
According to Danish legal discourse retroactive statutes that favour the tax payers are 
found all but unproblematic. As a consequence, the assessment of necessity often does 
not hinder, that retroactive tax bills are passed if the bill in mention is favourable to 
tax payer.  
 
(10) In the Netherlands, the Council of State provides advice to the government 
and Parliament with respect to legislative proposals. The Council of State has 
laid down criteria with respect to the question of when, in its opinion, 
granting retroactive effect to tax statutes is allowed. 
a. Does an institution like a Council of State (Conseil d'État) exist in your 
country? NB It might be that in your country instead of, or in addition 
to, the Council of State, another institution (e.g., the Supreme Court) 
could be asked for advice. If so, please answer the following questions 
(also) for that other institution. 
 
In Denmark, all ministerial bills pass a consultation process that includes a review by 
the Ministry of Justice.25 This review is partly of legal-technical nature, but the review 
by the Ministry of Justice also includes constitutional principles, EU-law and 
retroactivity.   
 
b. If so, does it follow certain rules to review proposed retroactivity in tax 
statutes? 
 
No, to our knowledge no certain rules exist concerning the Ministry of Justice’s 
review of ministerial bills. 
  
c. And does it follow certain rules to review whether or not 
grandfathering is necessary? 
 
No such procedural provisions exist concerning the Ministry of Justice’s review. 
 
d. Is there also a policy with respect to granting retroactive effect to tax 
statutes that are favourable to tax payers? 
 
As mentioned above, retroactive effect is considered far less problematic if the effect 
is granted to statutes that are favourable to tax payers. 
 
C.  Use of retroactivity in legislative practice 
 
(11) In the Netherlands, the legislator occasionally makes use of the so-called 
instrument of ‘legislating by press release’:26 it is announced in a press 
release that a bill is (or will be) proposed in Parliament and that the bill 
provides for retroactivity till the date of the press release.  
a. Is this instrument used in your country? 
                                                 
25 Cf. Jens Drejer: Lovgivningsprocessen på skatteområdet, published in Festsskrift til Ole Bjørn, 
2004, p. 193-94. 
26 For an example, see the disputed retroactivity in the Stichting Goed Wonen II case (ECJ C-376/02). 
 
Promulgation by press release has occurred in Denmark, but not in connection with 
tax statutes. For instance, statutory intervention by the Government in connection 
with labour disputes has been published by radio and TV. Pursuant to sec. 6 in statute 
no. 289 which was passed on May 20, 1987, the statute came into effect at the 
beginning of May 21, 1987, whereas sec. 5 came into effect immediately. In this 
instance, the urgency required promulgation by special means. The same model was 
used in a similar situation, where a collective labour agreement was put into effect 
immediately by statute no. 317 dated May 21, 1999. 
 
One of the best known cases regarding retroactivity is the so called Sudden Thaw-
case, cf. UfR 1958.955 Ø. The police stopped a transport in the afternoon on March 5, 
1956. The restrictions on driving in the sudden thaw period appeared from ministerial 
order no. 45 dated March 3, 1956, and in which the time of effect was set to be March 
5, 1956 at 6 a.m. The contents of the ministerial order were transferred via Ritzau to 
all daily newspapers while the order was published in the Danish Law Gazette on 
March 7. The Danish High Court found that immediate intervention was required why 
the ministerial order’s provisions on effect and the unusual promulgation were 
necessary to take care of vital interests.            
  
b. If so, in what kind of cases? E.g., only in cases of anti-abuse legislation 
or also in cases of a policy change and if the government wants to 
prevent so-called announcement effects? 
 
We refer to section C, (11), a. 
 
(12) Sometimes the Dutch tax legislator grants retroactive effect to tax statutes 
reaching further back in time from the moment of the first announcement 
(e.g., by press release) of the bill in question. 
a. Does your legislator grant retroactive effect in cases in which the 
instrument of ‘legislating by press release’ is not used? If so, in what 
kind of cases? 
 
Legislation by press release is infrequent in Denmark and retroactive effect that goes 
back further than the date on which the bill is introduced in the Parliament is also very 
uncommon as regards tax statutes.  Statute no. 614 dated December 19, 1984 
concerning share sale to holding companies had effect on all share sales in 1984. 
However, the statute offered a possibility of dispensation which in practice was very 
lenient when it came to share sales conducted before the date on which the bill was 
introduced i.e. December 4, 1984.27 
 
The normal procedure in recent legislative practice is that tax statutes that are 
disadvantageous to tax payers are only given effect from the date of introduction of 
the bill to the Danish Parliament. If the assessment of necessity results in lack of need 
for retroactivity, the statute is given effect from the ensuing income year.   
 
                                                 
27 Cf Aage Michelsen, Steen Askholt, Jane Bolander and John Engsig: Lærebog om indkomstskat, 13. 
ed., 2009, p. 110-11. 
b. And does it happen that the retroactive period reaches further back in 
the past than the date of the press release? If so, in what kind of cases? 
 
Yes, cf. section C, (12), a. 
 
(13) If the retroactive period is long, it could happen that pending legal 
proceedings are influenced. 
a. Does it happen in your country that retroactive effect is granted to 
substantive statutes as a result of which also pending legal proceedings 
are influenced? 
 
It has not occurred to our knowledge that retroactive effect is granted to substantive 
statutes also influence pending legal cases. 
  
b. Or is it common that pending legal proceedings are excluded from the 
application of the new statute? 
 
We refer to section A, (7), a and b. Danish legal discourse is unclear when it comes to 
procedural retroactivity. 
 
(14) In the Netherlands the legislator sometimes grants retroactive effect to tax 
statutes that are favourable to tax payers. 
a. If that also happens in your country, in what kind of situations does it 
happen? 
 
We refer to B, (9), d, and (10), d. Granting retroactive effect to statutes that favour 
occur in no specific pattern the decisive factor being a political wish to favour tax 
payers retroactively.  
 
D.  Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law) 
 
Introduction.  
Courts may or may not test Acts of Parliament against the national Constitution. In 
Dutch law, the courts are not allowed to test Acts of Parliament for compatibility with 
the Constitution nor with general legal principles, because of a constitutional 
prohibition to do so. The courts are however permitted to test Acts of Parliament for 
compatibility with international treaties: as far as such an Act infringes a treaty 
provision that has direct effect, the courts must not apply the Act. Furthermore, the 
courts are allowed to examine subordinate legislation (i.e. not Acts of Parliament) for 
compatibility with legal principles. 
With respect to the possibilities of a Dutch court to review retroactivity of tax 
regulations, the above implies that: 
(i) the retroactivity of an Act of Parliament on a tax matter cannot be tested against 
the principle of legal certainty (nor against the principle of legality); 
(ii) however, if an Act of Parliament on a tax matter falls within the scope of 
European Community law, the retroactivity of such an Act can be tested against the 
general principles of European Community law, viz., the protection of legitimate 
expectations and legal certainty;28 
                                                 
28 E.g., the Stichting Goed Wonen II case (ECJ C-376/02) 
(iii) the retroactivity of an Act of Parliament on a tax matter can also be tested against  
Article 1 of the First Protocol (‘protection of property’) to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR),29 although the Dutch Supreme Court has – up till now – 
never found retroactivity incompatible with that provision; 
(iv) the retroactivity of subordinate legislation can be tested against the principle of 
legal certainty. 
 
(15) Is it possible in the legal system of your country that courts test the 
retroactivity of a tax statute for compatibility with the Constitution and/or 
with general legal principles such as the principle of legal certainty (including 
the principle of legitimate expectations)? 
 
Danish legal theory distinguishes between formal and material constitutionality of 
parliamentary acts.30 Formal constitutionality concerns statutes’ compliance with 
constitutional provisions on the statute creation procedure e.g. sec. 22 of The Danish 
Constitution regarding promulgation of statutes.  
 
Material constitutionality on the other hand occurs when the substance of a statute is 
unconstitutional. 
 
Whereas there has not been much debate as to whether the Danish courts of law are 
competent to test statutes’ formal constitutionality,31 it has been disputed whether the 
courts were competent to test material constitutionality of statutes. According to 
recent constitutional law theory, the Danish courts are competent to test the material 
constitutionality of statutes based on solid court practice.32  
 
Hence, retroactivity is not considered unconstitutional in Danish legal theory why the 
Danish courts of law are not testing whether a statute’s retroactivity is constitutional 
but in stead whether a statute’s retroactivity is sufficiently substantiated by the 
legislator.  
   
(16) If, in your country, courts can test the retroactivity of a tax statute against the 
Constitution and/or with general legal principles, what examination method 
do courts apply? In other words: when would courts rule retroactivity 
incompatible? 
 
This question is not relevant to Danish law. We refer to section D, (15). 
 
(17) Do the courts in your country test the retroactivity of a tax statute against 
Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR? If so, have the courts ever found a tax 
statute containing retroactivity incompatible with Article 1 of the First 
Protocol ECHR? 
 
                                                 
29 E.g., compare the examination of the retroactive effect of a Finnish tax statute for compatibility with 
Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR in the case of M.A. and 34 Others against Finland (Application 
no. 27793/95 (decision); see the HUDOC database under ‘case law’ at <http://www.echr.coe.int/>). 
30 Cf. Peter Germer: Statsforsfatningsret, 4. ed., 2007, p. 210-216. 
31 Cf. e.g. UfR 1941.1071 H, UfR 1945.570 Ø, UfR 1967.22 H, UfR 1993.321 H and UfR 1994.29 H. 
32 Cf. Peter Germer: Statsforfatningsret, 4. ed., 2007, p. 210, Poul Andersen: Dansk Statsforfatningsret, 
1954, p. 466-69 and Henrik Zahle: Dansk forfatningsret 2, 3. ed., 2001, p. 157-61. 
The Danish courts of law are competent to test the compatibility of tax statutes or tax 
procedure with ECHR including art. 1 of the First Protocol concerning the protection 
of private property. The courts have never found a retroactive tax statute incompatible 
with art. 1 of the First Protocol to ECHR or the Danish Constitution sec. 73 which 
concerns the inviolability of property rights. 
 
ECHR is incorporated in Danish law by statute33 which means that citizens can 
complaint or take legal action against the Tax Administration with direct reference to 
ECHR. 
 
The Danish High Courts have established that tax imposition is not incompatible with 
sec. 73 of the Danish Constitution, cf. UfR 1958.595 V the reason on the one hand 
being that tax imposition is based on general provisions and on the other hand that 
taxes are paid in cash in stead of cession of concrete assets.34 
 
(18) If the courts in your country test retroactivity of Acts of Parliament and/or 
subordinate legislation against the principle of legal certainty, what 
examination method do the courts apply? 
 
The principle of certainty is not acknowledged as a separate legal principle in Danish 
legal theory, because substantive due process of law as a general legal principle 
contains the aspect of legal certainty. A retroactivity test of a statute by the Danish 
courts of law does not constitute a validity test based on constitutionality or 
fundamental legal principles such as the principle of substantive due process cf. 
section D, (15) above. 
 
(19) Do courts in your country use interpretations that avoid what might be 
retroactive applications, because such applications might raise further 
questions about legitimacy and validity? 
 
As a rule, the Danish courts of law enforce a principle of interpretation contra 
retroactivity which is almost the opposite approach than interpretations that avoid 
possible retroactive application. However, when the courts of law test the assessment 
of necessity for retroactivity some instances of a tendency towards leniency have been 
established. The case mentioned above in section A, (5), a – UfR 1999.1480 H – has 
been criticized because insufficient substantiation of the amendment’s retroactive 
effect was present in the legislative material to which the court referred. This court 
ruling is most commonly regarded as an exception that does not constitute general 
leniency. On the contrary, court practice generally demonstrates that the interpretation 
principle contra retroactivity is enforced persistently.   
 
(20) If courts in your country do not recognise limits on the use of retroactivity, is 
there a reason, e.g., the legislator is regarded to be sufficiently self-
disciplined? 
 
As the Danish Constitution and/or supranational provisions do not limit the 
legislator’s possibility of passing retroactive tax law bills, no further explanation for 
                                                 
33 Cf. Consolidated act. no. 750 dated October 19, 1998. 
34 Cf. Aage Michelsen, Steen Aksholt, Jane Bolander and John Engsig: Lærebog om indkomstskat, 13. 
ed., 2009, p. 109. 
the legislator’s competence is considered necessary. The legislative politico-legal 
principle demonstrated by the assessment of necessity proves that retroactivity is only 
applied on basis of careful considerations. Furthermore, the Danish courts of law 
require interpretational clarity to establish that the legislator has intended 
retroactivity. 
 
These instruments do now carry the same legal weight as constitutional provisions, 
but they serve their purpose by limiting the occurrences of retroactive statutes to 
exceptional cases. 
 
 
NB regarding questions 15-20: (i) please discuss justifications that are accepted by 
the courts in your country for granting retroactive effect by the tax legislator, and (ii) 
if there are examples of cases in which the judge had found retroactivity 
incompatible, please discuss these cases briefly. 
 
E. Retroactivity of case law 
 
Introduction 
The question of retroactivity of tax law not only arises with respect to the introduction 
of tax statutes, but also with respect to case law when a judgment has an erga omnes 
effect. The subject of retroactivity of case law is worth investigating separately, 
because it is related to the question of the nature of case law: when can case law be 
regarded as declaratory (‘only declaring what the law has ever been’) and when can it 
be regarded as constitutive (‘new law’). We will not deal with this here.35  
Nonetheless, at least in one situation transition law with respect to case law is very 
comparable with the transition law question with respect to changes in statutes. In that 
situation, the court explicitly abandons existing case law and formulates a new 
(general) rule.  
 
(21) If the Supreme Court of your country abandons existing case law and 
formulates a new (general) rule, does the Supreme Court provide in a kind of 
transition rule to limit the retroactive effect of its judgment (e.g., prospective 
overruling)? If so, does the Supreme Court only provide such a rule if the new 
rule is unfavourable to tax payers, or also if the new rule is favourable to tax 
payers (and thus unfavourable to the government)? If the latter is the case, 
does the Supreme Court make an exception for the tax payer concerned in the 
legal proceedings before the court? 
NB If there are peculiarities36 in the tax system of your country that are 
                                                 
35 Various items that relate to the subject of ‘retroactivity of case law’ (e.g. the item of limitation of the 
effects of case law of the European Court of Justice) are therefore not touched upon in this 
questionnaire either. 
36 For example, if the Dutch Supreme Court changes its interpretation of a certain statute in favour of 
the tax payers, the retroactive effect of that judgment is de facto limited because previously paid tax on 
a tax assessment will not be refunded, unless an appeal against the tax assessment has been made in 
time (i.e., within 6 weeks after the date of the assessment). It might be, however, that the tax system of 
another country is different, for example, in the sense that, in the situation described, a refund should 
be made by the tax authorities if it is clear that tax has been paid unnecessarily (according to the new 
interpretation). Since the financial consequences for the government of a change of interpretation might 
be great, this might be a reason for the Supreme Court for ‘prospective overruling’. 
relevant for understanding the way the Supreme Court rules in this respect, 
please state these peculiarities. 
 
The Danish court system is based on a two instance-principle and as a rule legal 
proceedings in tax law cases are filed at the City Courts as first instance. As a 
consequence, City Court rulings can be appealed to one of the two Danish High 
Courts, but civil law suits including tax cases cannot be appealed to the Danish 
Supreme Court unless the law suit is of a principle nature.37   
 
Rulings from the Danish Supreme Court are relatively uncommon which is illustrated 
by the number of cases in 2008: In 2008 16 tax law cases were appealed to the Danish 
Supreme Court whereas the number of cases in 2007 was 72. 
 
Since the Danish court reform in 2007, the Danish High Courts must in fact be 
considered the final instance in tax law cases. 
 
The Danish courts do not formulate transitional rules in case of rulings that abandon 
existing case law. Transitional provisions in connection with a change of practice are 
found in the Tax Administration Act. sec. 27 (1) (7). Pursuant to this provision, the 
tax payer can request a special resumption of a yearly tax statement if existing 
practice is abandoned by a final administrative decision from the National Danish Tax 
Tribunal or by a final judgement from the courts of law if the decision is favourable to 
the tax payer. The provision is also applicable if the Tax Ministry publishes a change 
of administrative practice in favour of tax payers. In these cases, special resumption 
of an otherwise closed yearly tax statement is allowed counting from the income year 
that the overruling decision concerned. Alternately, special resumption is always 
allowed counting from the income year that began but did not end three years before 
the year in which the first overruling of practice took place. 
 
If the Danish High Court delivers a tax payer favourable judgment on November 5, 
2009 concerning a tax assessment of the income year of 2003 and the High Court 
judgment affirms the previous City Court judgment from November 3, 2007, special 
resumption can be requested by tax payers concerning income years from and 
including 2003.38 
 
In these cases the Danish Tax Administration publishes an administrative notice 
containing information on the resumption options for tax payers. 
 
Unfavourable judgments of changes of administrative practice only have effect on 
future decisions and practice including pending and appealed cases. 
 
In addition, a controversial case law practice has developed in Denmark that involves 
a sort of retroactive effect. In several cases the Danish Tax and Customs 
                                                 
37 Cf. The Administration of Justice Act. sec. 226. Before comprehensive Danish court reform in 2007, 
all law suits in tax law cases were filed at the High Courts as first instance which meant that all tax law 
cases could be appealed to the Danish Supreme Court. An extraordinary possibility of third instance 
dispensation exists.  
38 It is a precondition that the City Court judgment overruled the decision by the administrative Danish 
National Tax Tribunal. Otherwise, special resumption is allowed counting from and including the 
income year in which the National Tax Tribunal reached its decision. 
Administration refuses to accept decisions from the National Danish Tax Tribunal, 
which is the final administrative appeals tribunal in Denmark. As a consequence, the 
Danish Tax and Customs Administration does not correct administrative practice even 
though this practice is in conflict with the decision by the National Danish Tax 
Tribunal. In these instances, the taxpayers cannot support their cases on the decision 
by the National Danish Tax Tribunal, which in effect results in retroactivity, if the 
courts of law assent to this approach in an ensuing judgment.39 
 
 
 
F.  Views in literature 
 
(22) Is there a general opinion in the fiscal literature of your country regarding 
retroactivity of tax statutes? Is there, for example, consensus with respect to 
the type of cases (e.g. anti-abuse legislation, legislation to abandon gaps in 
tax law, policy changes, etc.) in which it is considered justified (or the other 
way around: in which it is in any case considered not justified) to grant 
retroactive effect to tax statutes? 
 
The description above in section A, (1), a, corresponds to the general opinion in fiscal 
and constitutional law literature in Denmark regarding retroactivity of tax statutes.40 
Retroactive statutes occur in connection with anti-abuse legislation, to avoid 
hamstring when raising excise duties, but also in connection with legislation to close 
gaps in tax law. Normally, the retroactive effect is granted from the date on which the 
bill is introduced to the Parliament, but in special circumstances retroactive effect 
may be counted from an even earlier point of time. However, this is very rare.  
 
 
The law and economics view: Introduction. 
The law and economics view is an important theoretical view in the academic 
literature in the US on tax transitions. This view was developed and supported by 
especially Graetz41 and Kaplow.42 Brief, the law and economics view on tax 
transitions argues that changes in tax law should have retroactive effect43 because that 
is ‘efficient’. A very short summary of the line of reasoning is provided by, among 
others Fisch 
 
“Although fairness arguments are typically used to support prospective lawmaking, 
efficiency is generally viewed as favoring retroactivity. Efficient lawmaking can be 
defined as lawmaking that maximizes the net benefits of legal change. The traditional 
economic conception of rational or efficient legal change is based on the utilitarian 
                                                 
39 Cf. Aage Michelsen in R & R 2006/9 SM p. 259 ff ("Begrænset skattepligt - Luftkaptajner - 
Retskildehierarki") a comment on the Supreme Court’s judgment in SKM 2006.483 H. 
40 Cf. our reference to literature above in section A, (1), a.  
41 M.J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1977, pp. 47-87, and M.J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, Harvard Law 
Review 1985, pp. 1820-1841. 
42 L. Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, Harvard Law Review 1986, pp. 509-617, 
and L. Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 
2003, pp. 161-209. 
43 The economic view holds that there is no fundamental (but only a gradual) difference between 
(formal) retroactivity and retrospectivity. 
conception of a net gain in social welfare without regard for distributional issues. This 
conception explains the failure of economic analysis to address the moral concerns of 
fairness arguments. Retroactivity could produce net social gain and yet impose clearly 
identifiable costs; there are winners and losers when a law is applied retroactively. 
Efficiency arguments typically add an additional normative factor to the analysis: the 
assumption that legal change has occurred because of a determination that the new rule is 
an improvement. The view that the new rule improves the operative legal principles 
supports the application of that rule to as broad a class of cases as possible.”44 
 
In the meantime, other law and economics scholars (than Graetz and Kaplow), have 
developed views with a different emphasis. Shaviro, for example, argues that policy 
changes should be retroactive (in the terminology used here: should be retrospective), 
but should not be nominally retroactive (in the terminology used here: should not be 
retroactive).45 
 
(23) In the Netherlands, the law and economics view has so far provoked very 
little debate in fiscal literature and has not been invoked explicitly by the tax 
legislator or the Dutch State Secretary of Finance during parliamentary 
debate. 
a. Has the law and economics view on transition tax law, or other non-
traditional legal views, provoked a debate in your country? 
 
The law and economics view has not given rise to discussion regarding retroactivity 
in Danish law and economics theory. Arguments of an economical nature are included 
as part of the assessment of necessity on which the legislator bases retroactivity. For 
instance, the risk of the economic effects of hamstring can be the reason for granting 
retroactivity to a statute on excise taxes.    
 
b. If so, please provide a brief overview of the debate, and please state 
especially whether and, if so to what extent, the law and economics 
view (especially the dogmatic view of Graetz and Kaplow), or another 
non-traditional legal view, has gained support, e.g., from the legislator 
or in the fiscal literature. 
 
No specific law and economics debate or literature exists about retroactivity.  
                                                 
44 J.E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, Harvard Law Review 1997, 
p. 1088. 
45 D.N. Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief And 
Retroactivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp. 98-111. 
